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The political context of governments differs between the UK, Germany and 
Austria, but each government currently has a positive view of Public private 
Partnership (PPP). There are many similarities to the drivers for PPPs in Aus-
tria, Germany and the UK. The UK has had more experience, and the conser-
vative-led government in Austria has been moving towards greater use of 
PPPs of the “privatisation”-type, but only very cautiously towards PPPs of 
the “PFI-type”. The major motives for moving towards PPPs are macro-
economic or budgetary, especially in Germany and Austria, but also micro-
economic or improving the efficiency of public service delivery, especially in 
the UK. In all three countries PPPs appear to be a systematic middle respon-
se to the alternatives of privatisation or public service provision of infras-
tructure and operational support. There are more significant multi-tiered 
levels of government in the Federal systems of Germany and Austria, with 
many autonomous players including federal government, states and munici-
palities. Investment by the latter two exceeds investment expenditure of the 
federal government. In the more centralised UK system policies towards 
PPPs have been relatively rapid and similar, although not identical, across 
the UK. In Germany the search for a comprehensive approach (Gesamtkon-
zept) has slowed the dissemination of PPP; Austria seems to handle the 
issue more pragmatically. One issue that remains crucial to the future 
impacts of PPPs is whether they offer genuine and sustainable increases in 
efficiency and effectiveness compared to the alternatives. If they do then 
they should have a positive impact on future public resource availability, but 
if they do not then they may provide short-term financial and political bene-
fits, but at the cost of constraining future decision makers and placing grea-
ter pressures on public finances in the longer-term. 
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1. Public Private Partnership and Challenges for 
Economic Policy 
 
Economic policy has been confronted with a need to re-consider its role in 
order to pave the way for grasping the full benefit of a potential long-term eco-
nomic upswing (a “Kondratieff”-wave) based on the diffusion of new informa-
tion and communication technologies throughout the economy (Scherrer 2001, 
McQuaid 2003). The scope of economic policy to help shape the economic 
impact of ICT, and national economic policy autonomy in particular have been 
restricted by a variety of causes (Scherrer 2005). From a long-term perspec-
tive, the most important economic policies may be those which aim at foster-
ing creativity and facilitating change in order to enhance the economic agents' 
abilities to unfold the economic potential of these technologies (Michalski et al. 
1999, McQuaid 2002).  These policies target: first, the redesign of the regula-
tory framework which has been set up in the era of mass-production and 
which has partly become either obsolete or even an obstacle to reaping the 
economic benefits of the spread new technologies; second, the re-arranging of 
traditional work and incentive schemes; and third, the design of a framework 
which is conducive to experimental initiatives that create new spaces where 
entrepreneurship can succeed. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are relevant 
with respect to all three aspects. While the successful implementation of PPPs 
requires some re-regulation and has a somewhat experimental character, the 
redesign of the traditional incentive structure in a market economy is at the 
core of the concept. In this paper the term PPP will be restricted to those pro-
jects involving the private provision, but continued public funding, of services 
formally provided by the public sector, although it is recognised that PPPs may 
include other forms of partnership.  
There are many reasons for (and against) public and private bodies con-
sidering working in public private partnerships such as: resource availability; 
effectiveness; and legitimacy (McQuaid 1999). The motivations for, and types 
of, PPPs have varied over time, across sectors and between countries (see for 
example: the European Community’s Green Paper on PPPs, CEC 2004; Grout 
and Stevens 2003). Budget constraints have become a major restriction of 
national policy autonomy, and the concept of PPP has become relevant in this 
context in most European countries. More precisely: PPP has become relevant 
again, especially since the 1980s, because it is not an entirely new concept but 
it has had a long history in many countries. The paper does not seek to consider 
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the many advantages and disadvantages of individual types of PPP (see for 
instance: Coulson 2005; Budäus and Rüning 1997), but rather concentrates on 
comparing the broader motivations and implications of PPPs in the U.K., Ger-
many, and Austria. After a brief overview of a typology of PPPs, sections 3 and 
4 consider more general reasons for government involvement. Section 5 dis-
cusses the potential for sustainable overall (i.e. macro-economic) efficiency 
gains deriving from the implementation of PPPs. Conclusions are drawn in 
Section 6.  
 
2. Types of Public Private Partnership 
 
The UK has been a leader in the large-scale introduction of PPPs across 
the economy (for example: Ball et al. 2002). From the first PFIs/PPPs in 1987 
to the end of 2004 the UK government had signed 677 PPPs (or PFIs), worth 
nearly £43 billion (euro 65 billion), (Treasury 2005a) (Table 1). Although PFIs 
were initiated by the Conservative government (which were in power from 
1979 to 1997), the number of new PPPs peaked in the year 2000, after a sharp 
growth in the years just after the Labour government was elected in 1997 (and 
it is still in power in 2006). Indeed there were 62 new PFI/PPPs up until 1997, 60 in 
that year and 467 since 1997 (with 10 having no specified date). The values of PPPs 
have grown greater in more recent years as some large PPPs have some into 
place (especially in transport and health – see below). In terms of value, only 
8% of all PFI/PPPs were initiated before 1997, 6% in 1997 and 86% after 
1997. 
The UK government considers PPPs “to cover a range of business struc-
tures and partnership arrangements, from the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) to 
joint ventures and concessions, to outsourcing, and to the sale of equity stakes 
in state-owned businesses” (Treasury 2000, p. 8). The private sector has also 
played an important role in the dissemination of PPPs as the UK has a quite 
highly developed set of private institutions (funders, developers, project man-
agers, operators as well as banks, legal firms etc.) and a growing secondary 
market whereby PPP projects can be ’sold on’ by the developers of the project 
to other firms to carry on the contracts. The public sector (locally and nation-
ally) has also considerable experience in the UK. However, at a local level, indi-
vidual public bodies may be inexperienced, so for any individual project the private 
sector will often have considerably more experience than the local public body, 
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and may be better able to manipulate the long run return on the project to their 
advantage.  
 
Table 1: UK PPP Projects signed by year 1987 to 2004 
 
Year 
Number of Signed 
Projects Capital Value (£m) 
Percentage of total 
value 
1987 1 180,0 0,40 
1988 0 0,0 0,00 
1989 0 0,0 0,00 
1990 2 336,0 0,80 
1991 2 6,0 0,00 
1992 5 518,5 1,20 
1993 1 1,6 0,00 
1994 2 10,5 0,00 
1995 11 667,5 1,60 
1996 38 1 560,1 3,70 
1997 60 2 474,9 5,80 
1998 86 2 758,0 6,50 
1999 99 2 580,4 6,00 
2000 108 3 934,2 9,20 
2001 85 2 210,8 5,20 
2002 70 7 732,5 18,10 
2003 52 14 854,1 34,80 
2004 45 2 809,8 6,60 
N/A 10 64,6 0,20 
TOTAL 677 £42 699.4 100.0% 
Source: Treasury 2005a 
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The UK government set out three main categories of public private part-
nerships concerning: ownership; provision of services (including infrastructure) 
to the public sector; and the selling of public sector services to others (such as 
through the exploitation of patents). In addition PPPs have fourth, overlapping 
role in providing enabling organisations to provide common ground between 
public, private and third sectors to promote economic and social development 
policies.  
Under the first category PPPs are concerned with the introduction of pri-
vate sector ownership into state-owned businesses. This involves a range of 
possible structures including a stock market flotation, or the introduction of a 
strategic partner, or with the sale of either a majority or a minority ownership 
stake to the private sector. Hence this can be seen as a continuation of the 
privatisation philosophy of the 1980s and 1990s primarily introduced by the 
Conservative government after 1979. The sectors that PPPs have covered in 
the UK are diverse, contributing to 20 departments or devolved governments 
(Table 2) and particularly in Transport (with 50.2% of all projects by value), De-
fence (10%), Health (11%) and Education and Skills (7%). Devolved govern-
ments (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) projects cover a range of areas, 
but are often focused on health and transport. Although accounting for around 
9% of the UK population, Scotland only accounted for 5.3% of PPPs, perhaps 
because of the relatively high government expenditure per capita (funded from 
the UK government as it does not raise its own revenue), and partly perhaps 
due to a slowness in introducing PPPs. This may partly be explained by some 
very bad examples of early PFI/PPPs in Scotland, such as the Skye Bridge, 
which was opened in 1995 but brought back into public ownership in 2004. For 
instance Monbiot (2000) describes some of the background and several 
government reports were highly critical on its poor value for money (House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee, 1998; NAO, 1999). 
The second form of PPP concerns the provision of and/or operation of in-
frastructure. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and other arrangements are 
where the public sector contracts to purchase services on a long-term basis, 
so as to take advantage of private sector management skills and also to pro-
vide an incentive for the private sector by having a risk element in the private 
finance. This type of PPP includes concessions and franchises, where a private 
sector partner takes on the responsibility for providing a public service, includ-
ing maintaining, enhancing or constructing the necessary infrastructure (e.g. 
many school or hospital investments or, in transport, the ill fated Skye Bridge 
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PFI which was returned to public ownership after less than a decade). Basically 
such PPPs may be classified on two continuums, with different levels of own-
ership and involvement, of: who operates the service; and who provides the 
facilities (building and/or equipment etc.). PPPs may involve build and operate 
schemes (where the private sector both builds a facility and operates it for a 
defined period, such as 25 years, before handing it back to the public sector); 
to purely operating a service, while using public sector owned and constructed 
facilities; to providing a private sector facility, to be operated by public sector 
staff (or using private sector staff to maintain the facility and public sector staff 
to provide services based in the facility, such as health services). In some 
cases the private firm may sell on their interests to other firms with, as men-
tioned above, a market for aspects of the ’second phases’ of PPPs being de-
veloped in countries such as the UK. 
 












Cabinet Office 2 347.7 0,8 
HM Customs & Excise 2 170.3 0,4 
Constitutional Affairs 13 306.4 0,7 
Culture, Media & Sport 7 68.6 0,2 
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs 13 632.7 1,5 
Transport 45 21 432.1 50,2 
Education & Skills 121 2 922.8 6,8 
Health 136 4 901.2 11,5 
Trade & Industry 8 180.8 0,4 
Work & Pensions 11 1 341.0 3,1 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2 91.0 0,2 
HM Treasury 2 189.0 0,4 
Home Office 37 1 095.8 2,6 
Inland Revenue 8 453.8 1,1 
Defence 52 4 254.8 10,0 
Northern Ireland 39 528.8 1,2 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 61 972.1 2,3 
Office of Government Commerce 1 10.0 0,0 
Scotland 84 2 249.3 5,3 
Wales 33 551.3 1,3 
TOTAL 677 £42 699.4 100.0% 
Source: Treasury 2005a 
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The third type of UK PPP is generating commercial value from public as-
sets, such as selling Government services into wider markets, and other part-
nership arrangements where private sector expertise and finance are used to 
exploit the commercial potential of Government assets. For example innova-
tions from government research laboratories, including defence research, may 
be exploited through a joint PPP. 
Fourth, PPPs have also been used to provide organisations to promote 
specific policies. These may range from general local economic development 
policies (McQuaid 1999) to more specific policies aimed at helping the UK to 
improve the ICT infrastructure and to meet the Lisbon Agenda targets for em-
ployment and productivity growth through ICT (HM Treasury 2005b). To take a 
specific case, the UK Government set targets for both the competitiveness 
and the extensiveness of the broadband market, including having the most 
extensive and competitive broadband market in the G7 by 2005, although in 
the short term there may be a trade-off between these goals, and focussing on 
rolling out broadband may be at the expense of competition (DTI 2004). To 
advise them on the development and implementation of the government’s 
broadband strategy a UK public/private partnership, the Broadband Stake-
holder Group (BSG), was established in April 2001. The BSG is co-funded by 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and a number of private sector 
companies. The BSG notes that a wide range of broadband initiatives are being 
planned or implemented across the country with differing levels of public sec-
tor intervention, including: integrated public private partnerships; public sec-
tor funded infrastructure provision; public sector demand aggregation; subsi-
dised broadband trials and technology pilots; promotion and content commis-
sioning schemes and community network initiatives (DTI 2004). Hence PPPs 
are seen as one of a number of options for different circumstances (particularly 
where there is likely to be little commercial provision due to, for instance, low 
population density as in rural areas). 
Germany and Austria both historically have had experience with public-
private sector partnerships dating back to at least the 19th century (e.g. the 
construction of parts of the Austrian railroad network by PPP) and more re-
cently in the second half of the 20th century (e.g. key urban development pro-
jects in Germany in the 1980s). Nevertheless both countries have been late-
comers within the recent PPP-movement (compare: Bastin 2003 and Beirat 
1998, for Austria; and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2002 and Sack 2003, for Germany). 
The overall amount of investment has been very limited, notwithstanding a 
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few large investment projects (e.g. the heavy goods vehicles toll systems 
which have been deployed in both countries) and several smaller projects. 
In Germany, PPPs have reached a significant level only very recently. A 
survey of PPPs in infrastructure (DIFU 2005) shows that the number of con-
tracts doubled in 2004 and 2005 compared to the years before. The stock of 
investment in PPPs in which German municipalities have involved amounts to 
approximately 3 billion Euro; this is between two and three per cent of com-
munities’ gross fixed investment. The average investment of projects at the 
central state and federal states level is 70 million Euro compared to 13 million 
Euro at the municipal level. The survey also captures planned projects by mu-
nicipalities, federal states, and the central state which are together estimated 
to comprise an additional two billion Euro. Currently communities use PPPs 
mostly in providing infrastructure for educational and sports/tourism/leisure 
purposes (which comprise approximately 30 per cent of all projects, each), 
while the federal states and the central state engage in PPPs predominantly 
for building traffic infrastructure, prisons and administrative buildings.  
In Austria, among public sector PPP partners, municipalities dominate. 
Schaffhauser-Linzatti (2004) identified 185 existing PPP projects and found that 
in 58% of projects municipalities were involved, while the central state and the 
federal states were the public partners in 21% of all PPP projects, each. 
Communities are mostly involved in the energy, health, sewage and wastewa-
ter disposal, and urban development industries; this structure largely reflects 
the municipalities’ constitutional competencies. PPP projects at the municipal-
ity level on average are small, and as far as energy projects are concerned 
“contracting” models are dominating. The central state is predominantly in-
volved in education and technology projects, while most projects of the federal 
states are in the traffic sector.  
There is a range of economic, social and political reasons and motives for 
the growth of PPPs in the three countries over the last two decades. These 
revolved around: firstly budget or macro-economic factors (the availability of 
public investment resources); and secondly around more micro-economic ar-
guments concerning the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending. It is 
argued that in Germany and Austria the main drivers of PPPs have so far ap-
peared to focus predominantly, but not exclusively, upon macro-economic 
budget factors, such as the gap between public expenditure requirements 
and desires and potential revenues. In the UK, while these may be impor-
tant, there has been an emphasis upon micro-economic factors – bringing 
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in greater innovation and efficient management, as well as, especially in the 
1980s and 1990s, being linked to a transfer of ownership and control from the 
public to private sector. Hence the comparison of the countries is of some 
interest. 
 
3. Macro-Economic Drivers of Public Private  
Partnership 
 
In each of the three countries there has been a large requirement for pub-
lic investment in services and infrastructure, especially since the 1990s. This 
investment need is due to a variety of factors, some of them being specific to, 
or at least significant in, Germany and Austria compared to other countries 
(Budäus 2003). In the transport sectors the enlargement of the European Un-
ion has shifted both countries from the border into the centre of the European 
Union, with a strong need to improve transport infrastructure to the new 
Member States. In some traditional utility sectors, like water supply and 
wastewater disposal, urbanisation trends and re-investment requirements 
have increased the current investment need. In all three countries demo-
graphic change and technological advances require heavy investment in the 
health sector. In the UK in the late 1990s there was also a legacy of under-
investment in public infrastructure (schools, hospitals, transport etc.) from the 
previous two or three decades. This was worsened as during the 1980s and 
1990s as local government, in particular, had often reacted to budget con-
straints through reducing maintenance, resulting in a long-term repair and re-
building backlogs, together with requirements to bring in new technology in-
frastructure.  
As public finances were insufficient for the levels of investment required 
private resources were used to fund services and facilities previously paid di-
rectly through public expenditure. In Germany the cost of re-unification turned 
out to be much higher than expected, and PPPs have been increasingly con-
sidered as a means to relieve public budgets. So, for example, from the pub-
lic’s point of view this has been a major motivation for establishing the high-
way-toll system – which is set to raise finance for highway construction – as a 
PPP. Nevertheless in the recent academic debate on PPPs in Germany the 
argument has been called a “wide spread misunderstanding” by the members 
of the scientific board of the Journal of Public and Non-profit Enterprises (ZögU 
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2004), the leading German journal in this area, claiming that private sector fi-
nancial contributions regularly are only of a transitory nature.  
In Austria, the central government’s budget was hit by the impacts of the 
increases in public consumption and transfer spending programmes in the 
early 1990s and by relatively increased demands for public funding due to slow 
economic growth. Therefore tapping new sources of finance for public infra-
structure was one of the major motives for PPP in Austria listed by the Beirat 
für Wirtschafts- und Sozialfragen (which is a committee of the informal but still 
influential Austrian “social partnership”; Beirat 1998). Accordingly budget rea-
sons were the major motives for PPPs in a variety of fields, particularly in the 
construction and operation of waste water treatment plants by municipalities 
(Föller and Freitag 1999), and in the transport sector where a few roads have 
already been realised (see a critical report by Oberösterreichischer Landes-
rechnungshof/court of audit of the province Upper Austria, 2002), and major 
highway links in the Vienna area are to be realised using PPP.  
In the UK in some local cases the PPP mechanism is used to raise public 
investment for realising land values that would normally be unavailable to the 
public body without the PPP. For example, some local authorities have pro-
moted PPPs that would result in greenbelt or recreation sites (such as sports 
fields) being developed. Normally such sites could not be developed because 
they are ’protected’ by the planning system and other local and national poli-
cies (e.g. to promote sports and maintain the provision of sports fields). Private 
housing would not normally be allowed to be developed on such sites, and 
local authorities permitting such developments would be accused of succumb-
ing to the interests of private developers. However, under the PPP, proposals 
are made to build the school (or other facility) on such ’protected’ sites, in the 
expectation that local people will not oppose a new public facility. The local 
authority (or other public body) is then able to sell the former school site as 
housing. The net result is that the previous greenbelt has been built upon and 
there has been an increase in housing development in locations that local 
planning policies often would not necessarily have permitted.  
In Germany and Austria, which are members of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU), public finances are constrained by the requirements of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union and the stability and growth pact, particularly in times of 
weak economic conditions. The impact of the restrictions has been felt at all 
levels of government due to intra-national “stability pacts” which require state 
and municipal governments to keep in line with the national requirements to 
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meet the targets stipulated in the national stability programmes as part of the 
EU’s stability and growth pact procedure. As state and municipal governments 
cover the bulk of public investment expenditure, PPPs have become particu-
larly attractive for them as a measure to relieve their budgets. The pressure to 
use PPPs to relieve pressure on government budgets has been stronger in 
Germany, compared to Austria, as public finances are strained more severely. 
In the UK policy has been to maintain state finances somewhat similar to the 
requirements of the European Monetary Union. The ’Golden Rule’ whereby 
public finances are balanced over the economic cycle may limit the amounts 
that taxes should rise and encourage ’off balance sheet’ funding where PPP 
finances do not appear as large capital expenditures in the year in which they 
occur, but rather as a series of smaller annual ’revenue’ expenditures over the 
life of the project.  
Reducing the overall tax burden (including social security contributions) is 
another driver of PPP, particularly in Germany and Austria, countries in which 
the tax burden on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is well above EU-average. 
Tax competition within and outside the European Union – in particular with the 
new Member States – has made it difficult and risky to raise these ratios fur-
ther. Thus the size of the tax burden has become a key issue of political de-
bate both in Germany and Austria in which (micro-) economic arguments have 
begun to play a role. In the UK, in general, there is also pressure from opposi-
tion parties, which may make most governments reluctant to raise direct taxa-
tion. Pressures from globalisation and the ageing demographic structures of 
the countries also suggest that in the longer term significant tax rises are likely 
to be more difficult than in the past. 
The greater use of user charges (rather than paying for individual services 
out of general taxation) can also more generally be seen as a move towards 
using market mechanisms to achieve more efficient management of demand 
for infrastructure rather than primarily providing new infrastructure to meet 
existing or expected demand. It can be seen as partly linked to wider user or 
polluter pays principles, whereby market mechanisms are used to change be-
haviour and the distribute the costs concerning environemntal pollution. Road 
user charging is an example of the greater use of user charges in transport, 
with some pilots schemes being developed in the UK as a possible forerunner 
for national road pricing, while Germany has already developed a scheme for 
heavy goods vehicles. The technology for such large scheme may well require 
the greater use of ICT based PPPs in future, in order to develop the necessary 
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technology and the implementation of the policies, although Fietelson and 
Solomon (2004) suggest that adoptiing transport innovations is the outcome of 
a political process rather than simply diffusing technical innovation. 
Deregulation and economic structural change has made some sectors, 
which had been dominated by public firms, attractive for PPPs. Formerly shel-
tered sectors such as parts of the transport or health services have turned or 
are expected to become more competitive markets with the entry of private 
competitors or the transfer of organisations from public to private, or the crea-
tion of ’internal markets’ (internal to the public providers, as in the UK health 
service in the 1990s).  
Finally, the European Union Green Paper on PPPs (CEC 2004) and other 
development policies at the local, national and European Union levels (Jones 
1999) deliberately promoted network building between private and public part-
ners, particularly in the fields of structural and regional policies and the creation 
of PPPs in order to reinforce collective entrepreneurship (Silva and Rodriguez 
2005). 
 
4. Micro-Economic Drivers of Public Private  
Partnership 
 
Part of the PPP agenda, particularly in the UK, is to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the provision of public services. This is done mainly 
through innovations from other, usually private sector, approaches, and the 
development of appropriate incentives to each party. These incentives are 
claimed to include the introduction of competition or the threat of competition 
in the early stage of deciding upon the PPP (as firms compete to have their 
PPP chosen) and a transfer of real risks to the developer or operator.  
The UK government (Treasury 2000) argues that PPPs enable them to tap 
into the disciplines, incentives, skills and expertise that private sector firms 
have developed in the course of their normal everyday business, while releas-
ing the full potential of the people, knowledge and assets in the public sector. 
An analysis of the internet-based provision of information about a business 
location (Scherrer 2002) shows that these arguments seem to be particularly 
relevant for providing ICT based public services. Here PPPs might be suppor-
tive for changing the organisational structure of the units which provide the 
service, for adjusting the organisational culture in order to enable these institutions 
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to meet the needs of customers, including those in the private business sec-
tor, better and for closing specific knowledge gaps. The private sector in-
volvement, the Treasury (2000) argues further, should result in greater com-
mercial incentives for delivering efficient and effective services, a greater fo-
cus on customer requirements, and new and innovative approaches to provid-
ing services or infrastructure. PPPs then may help improve the operation of 
state-owned enterprises or replace them with private providers. Meanwhile 
Government retains the responsibility and democratic accountability for: decid-
ing between competing objectives; defining the chosen objectives, and then 
seeing that they are delivered to the standards required; and ensuring that 
wider public interests are safeguarded.  
The micro-economic drivers of PPPs emphasize the importance of choice 
and implementation schemes to exploit possible efficiency gains in the provi-
sion of public services. This reflects the outcomes of the debates in the 1980s 
concerning whether the public sector should have an enabling role, determin-
ing the form and level of public services, or a role as sole provider of services 
(see for instance: Giloth and Mier 1993). In other words, the public sector has 
to decide whether they should provide services or carry out activities them-
selves or should they get someone else (in the private or Third-sector) to do 
them for them? The increased role of PPPs suggests that the enabling view of 
government and governance has to a degree prevailed. In addition to the bene-
fits of an enabling approach, PPPs have potential problems concerning: the 
ability to learn the lessons from providing the service in order to develop a 
policy; the availability of actors who can carry out the service, be they in the 
private, public or Third-sectors; and the danger of the organisation failing to 
’learn’ from past experience and so repeating mistakes of the past or ’reinvent-
ing the wheel’ as there may be a lack of corporate memory. The theoretical 
and empirical benefits of economies of scale may be outweighed by the disad-
vantages of lack of local knowledge and the lack of continuity on the part of 
large-scale providers. In the UK PPPs have also restricted the ability of decision 
makers to reduce their maintenance, or even provision, of facilities at times of 
budget tightening (see below). Some of the constraints on decision makers 
related to PPPs are now considered.  
In Germany and Austria micro-economic factors are not neglected, of 
course, but compared to the UK, ’Value for Money’ considerations are less 
prominent in the debate about advantages and disadvantages of PPP. As in the 
UK, “privatisation-type” PPPs and “PFI-type” PPPs have to be distinguished. 
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Due to the historically large share of state owned enterprises in sectors like 
mining, heavy industries, and banking (particularly in Austria) a process of pri-
vatisation has aimed at reducing government interference in management 
decisions, partly as government pursued goals other than micro-economic or 
efficiency-oriented ones. While formally, in many cases, more or less private 
sector-type corporate governance mechanisms existed in most of these firms, 
actual interference by governments at the federal, state, and sometimes even 
local levels, was common. The formal corporate governance structures are 
likely to converge towards private sector governance structures as most for-
merly government owned enterprises have become at least partly privatised. 
In the public, and even in the scientific, debate this process was labelled “pri-
vatisation” both in Germany and Austria, even in those cases when only a 
minority ownership stake was sold to private investors. The public to (partly-) 
private-enterprises in most cases have not been considered as being PPPs (for 
example the survey of PPP projects in Austria by Schaffhauser-Linzatti (2004) 
includes virtually no fully privatisation-type PPPs).  
PFI-type PPPs have been less important in Germany and have only rarely 
been implemented in Austria. In both countries the provision of public infra-
structure (particularly in the transport sector) has been largely state provided 
and funded. Most infrastructure which is provided by central, regional and mu-
nicipal government is in relatively good condition and, although the quality of 
some government services has been criticized, this criticism has been limited. 
The scientific community both in Austria (e.g. Puwein et al. 2004) and in Ger-
many (e.g. ZgöU 2004) formulated very differentiated positions towards the 
possible efficiency gains through PPP. Such efficiency gains could only be 
expected if a wide range of conditions are met, and to realise efficiency gains 
of increased private sector involvement in the provision of public infrastructure 
would not necessarily require PPP models as traditional public investment 
(based on the concept of “Generalunternehmer” taking comprehensive re-
sponsibility for the construction process) could yield similar results in terms of 
efficiency (ZgöU 2004, p. 412). Reports about the negative implications of pri-
vatisation of public infrastructure in other countries have added to the con-
cerns about private sector involvement in the provision of infrastructure in the 
German and even more so in the Austrian public debate.  
Public awareness and interest in PPP has been increased in Germany and 
Austria by some major domestic firms’ involvement in PPP projects. Interest in-
creased in order to help make these and other firms fit for international competition 
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and to warrant that a bigger piece of the PPP-cake would be distributed to 
domestic firms. This motive is particularly important in the the two countries’ 
construction industries, which have suffered severely from a drop in domestic 
public investment, and thus had been forced to focus more on the export 
business. Construction firms, partly due to international competition, have 
often tried to become infrastructure operators; a few have achieved this very 
successfully. In addition large firms with core businesses in a variety of indus-
tries – like Siemens and Deutsche Telekom in Germany, and the national 
highway operator ASFINAG in Austria – have entered this market. The firms’ 
lobbying for PPP-financed infrastructure gained more momentum when a few 
banks, which started to specialize in PPP-finance in the second half of 
the1990s, joined the effort. 
Finally, the distribution of costs and benefits of new ICT PPPs on different 
parts of society is important, especially where they are funded out of public 
expenditure (McQuaid et al. 2004). The proposed use of ICT in the provision of 
public services has been argued, in the UK and elsewhere, as reflecting a be-
lief in the potential for new technologies to promote the social inclusion of 
disadvantaged individuals and communities. This is partly based on the idea 
that: “ICT can have a far-reaching impact on the quality of life of marginalised 
segments of the population, by providing more responsive and transparent 
governance as well as improving the reach and delivery of health, education 
and other social services” (ILO 2001). The UK government has argued for us-
ing ICT as a tool for social inclusion policy (DTI 2000). For example, the New 
Opportunities Fund invested over £250 million to develop a national ’electronic 
library network’ which provided web-based facilities and resources through 
existing public libraries and dedicated ’ICT learning centres’ in disadvantaged 
areas (Liff and Steward 2001). The UK government’s ’WiredUp Communities’ 
initiative provided broadband Internet access, digital television, mobile and 
standard telephone links, and advice and support services for all residents in 
selected pilot areas (DfES 2002). The objective was to assess how individual 
access to the Internet can transform opportunities for people living in these 
communities, by developing new ways of accessing learning, work and public 
services. The take up of Internet services has varied widely between and 
within communities, with overall Internet use in pilot areas ranging between 
50% and 90% (Devins et al. 2003).  
It has also been argued that the Internet’s capacity to help in the sharing 
of information, and in increasing the participation of individuals, can lead to the 
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growth of more demand-responsive services from the ’bottom up’, and so 
facilitate a more democratic and dynamic relationship between public service 
professionals and their clients (Carter and Grieco 2000). However, the 
introduction of new technologies has generally tended to benefit the 
more advantaged, (Servaes and Heinderyckx 2002) and ICT infrastructure 
development (including broadband) lags behind in many rural and dis-
advantaged urban areas, when compared with more affluent communi-
ties and centres of employment (US Department of Commerce 1999). By 
carefully specifying the terms of PPPs it may be possible to improve (or 
make worse) such distributional effects.  
 
5. Efficiency Gains or Losses through Public  
Private Partnership? 
 
For most OECD member states it may be assumed that so far there ex-
ists only a minor macro-economic impact of PPP on macro-economic efficiency 
because – the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand being possible excep-
tions – this dimension of PPP may be assumed to be relatively small. As infra-
structure and services are provided by the public sector, and thus financed by 
taxes, resources are distributed from the private sector to the public sector. 
Assuming the – debatable – position that PPPs may be instrumental in reduc-
ing government activity to its core competences, because private production 
of goods is claimed by some to be “always more cost efficient” and “stronger 
oriented towards the needs of demand than public production” (Oberender 
and Rudolf 2004, translation by the authors), PPPs would potentially lead to 
sustainable gains in overall economic efficiency which would be reflected by a 
reduced tax burden (tax to GDP ratio) and/or by an improved quality of ser-
vices. The argument is based on the idea that the distortion of the allocation 
restricts economic freedom, which might reduce overall economic efficiency 
and competitiveness; and also a high (marginal) taxation is further considered a 
major cause of tax avoidance.  
Although it is of limited significance, the tax to GDP ratio has become an 
influential indicator of the tax burden and thus of the intensity of government 
intervention. Thus, in the context of PPPs and overall efficiency, a major issue 
of concern is whether PPPs are used as a means to reduce the apparent tax 
burden as measured by the tax to GDP-ratio? If activities can be shifted, at 
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least partly, from the public sector to the private sector then it can be argued 
that, ceteris paribus, a reduction of the tax burden should be achieved. This 
may be only an apparent shift in tax burden as public sector liabilities will re-
main even if capital or operating expenditure is reduced in the short term. 
However, if PPPs actually improve efficiency then there could be a reduction in 
tax to GDP-ratios without a loss of public sector provision (and the reverse if 
PPPs are less efficient overall). For identifying the potential impact of PPPs on 
overall efficiency and tax to GDP-ratios several dimensions of PPPs have to be 
distinguished in order to define the relevant scenario for comparisons with 
alternative forms of providing and financing.  
First, what is the alternative to PPP finance of a project that is relevant for 
comparison? The impact of a PPP-project on overall efficiency and tax to GDP-
ratios will be different: if the project could not be accomplished otherwise; if it 
could be achieved only at a later period when the financial situation of public 
budget would have improved; or if it could be achieved only by debt finance. If 
most of a construct and operate-type PPP project’s construction is funded by 
government debt, then PPP normally will reduce debt, interest payments, and 
government spending on public sector staff and other costs. However, if the 
costs of the contracts are allocated to current government expenditure, then 
there should not be any difference in operating costs between a PPP situation 
and direct government provision (assuming efficiencies are the same in each 
case and that all labour, capital and other costs, including pensions are fully 
costed in). The capital expenditure on a public sector project will normally lead 
to an increase in debt, while the PPP expenditure may not be allocated against 
government capital expenditure (although in a perfect market the long-term 
costs of each should theoretically be the same). 
Second, experience with public private partnerships has been mixed so 
far (Joumard et al. 2004; Puwein et al. 2004). Some projects have been con-
sidered a success, having been completed on time and budget and having 
proved to be a cost effective method of delivering public services, while others 
have failed to deliver the expected gains. There have been significant delays 
associated with the interpretation of relevant contracts, cost overruns have 
been experienced because parts of projects had not been fully submitted to 
competitive pressures, and PPPs have also entailed bailouts by the public sec-
tor in a number of countries (see for example, WATIAC 2004). A recent survey 
of approximately 200 PPP projects in Germany, sponsored by the “PPP Task 
Force” of the German Ministry of Transport and Construction, suggests a 
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more optimistic view of the experience PPPs finding out that the public admin-
stration’s efficiency expectations have been regularly met (DIFU 2005). How-
ever, care needs to be taken concerning these optimistic views as it may be 
that the efficiency of PPP projects has been solely measured by overall effi-
ciency judgements of those persons who initiated the projects and were re-
sponsible for its implementation, and that most respondents in the survey did 
not answer the question about efficiency expectations. So assumptions have 
to be made on the efficiency of a PPP project in comparison with other forms 
of service delivery. If a PPP project – particularly of the construct and operate 
type – is less financially efficient than a debt financed project then taxes will go 
up and vice versa. In the case of ICT projects there are many UK, and other, 
examples of large cost and time overruns and poorly performing projects (e.g. 
the Inland Revenue etc.), due to accountability, technology and project man-
agement issues (POST 2003), each of which can be affected by the use of 
PPPs although it is not necessarily clear if a purely public sector procurement 
would have been more efficient.  
Third, it makes a difference if a PPP project is financed by government 
taxes or by user charges over its life cycle. User charge financed PPP projects 
may have a downward impact on the tax burden and tax to GDP-ratios, al-
though some sort of a financial illusion might be involved: citizens might prefer 
paying user charges for the use of (semi-) private services to paying taxes for 
public goods. However, if it is hard to avoid such expenditure there is – given 
equal efficiency of the alternatives – an equal burden on private income in both 
cases. Economically user charges then come very close to taxation, which is 
unproblematic if the principle of equivalence finance is considered to be supe-
rior to ability-to-pay-finance and if the supply of the service is the same in each 
case (arguably tax funded public provison could over or under estimate the 
supply and demand). Nevertheless it is likely that efficiency considerations 
may stand against equity considerations. There may also be distributional and 
equity issues and the burden of taxes and user charges may vary between 
individuals. 
If a PPP project is financed by government debt, and if taxes are collected 
during the use and pay-back period of the project, then the contractual design 
could make a difference for tax burden-comparisons. Assuming that PPP and 
government funded projects are equally efficient there should be no cash flow 
if the debt to pay for the project is paid back evenly every year. However, if the 
debt is paid back unevenly (e.g. in early years more interest but even amounts 
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of capital are paid) then PPPs might result in less expenditure in early years 
and more in later years – which is attractive for government, of course. How-
ever, when inflation is considered the picture may differ according to contract 
details: if PPP payments go up with inflation then in later years there could be 
greater real public expenditure – and overall efficiency could be reduced. 
Fourth, the statistical treatment of public expenditure may play a role in 
the time path of tax to GDP-ratios and thus in the interpretation of “efficiency 
gains”. Conventional public investment is treated as expenditure in public ac-
count statistics in the periods when projects are undertaken. In the case of 
PPP – e.g. when the public sector purchases services from infrastructure utili-
ties – public expenditure is spread over a much longer period. Consequently in 
periods when reliance on PPPs is increasing there will be a transitory reduction 
of public expenditure and of the tax to GDP-ratios. 
Fifth, as discussed earlier, PPPs can be used to realise the value of public 
assets that could not normally be achieved (for political reasons). The example 
of building new schools on greenbelt land and then selling the former school 
site for housing has been discussed earlier. While such a transaction could 
possibly be carried out solely through public transactions, it is much more diffi-
cult to argue to do so politically, as opposed to ’blaming it’ on private develop-
ers. In such cases PPPs could contribute to raise overall efficiency. 
However, sixth, there may be changes in future freedom of action. There 
is a danger of long-term PPP contracts tying an organisation (such as a gov-
ernment department) into a specific type of technology (or a particular building 
layout and usage) for decades, and hence reducing flexibility and the introduc-
tion of newer techologies in the future. For example, a major issue is if a PPP 
is used to build a school or hospital suitable for 2000 IT technology, but when 
technology, and/or the organisation of the activity, changes it may be very ex-
pensive to change the IT and other infrastructure and building layouts and so 
reduce future adaptability and efficiency and effectiveness. 
As the dimensions of PPP interact, a comprehensive analysis would have 
to take into account quite a large number of different cases or scenarios. Our 
analysis demonstrates that there is a broad scope of potential outcomes re-
garding the impact of PPP on overall efficiency and tax to GDP-ratios, and that 
there is no straightforward answer to the relationship between PPP and overall 
efficiency.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
The political context of governments differs between the UK, Germany 
and Austria, but each government currently has a positive view of PPP. In 
Germany, and even more so in Austria, there is a strong preference for a con-
sensus society, and the call for reduction of government intervention is, argua-
bly, not as strongly motivated by ideological concerns as in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. In the UK the current government has argued for PPPs on resource avail-
ability, efficiency and quality of delivery grounds while accepting continued 
government control and financing of most services and infrastructure. The 
consensus preference has been stronger in Austria although a change oc-
curred in Austria after 2000, as reducing government intervention and the tax 
to GDP-ratio has since been formulated as a deliberate policy goal, and PPPs 
could serve as one way to achieve this. In all three countries there appears to 
be a reluctance to increase the level of direct privatisation in most cases, al-
though PPPs can in some cases be seen as a middle way between privatisa-
tion and public delivery. 
There are more significant multi-tiered levels of government in the Federal 
systems of Germany and Austria, with many autonomous players including 
federal government, states and municipalities. Investment by the latter two 
exceeds investment expenditure of the federal government. In the more cen-
tralised UK system, there has been the devolved government in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland since the late 1990s. However, public expenditure 
and infrastructure investment in these devolved territories is still highly con-
trolled by central UK government, who funds the vast majority of their income. 
Hence policies towards PPPs have been relatively rapid and similar, although 
not identical, across the UK. In Germany the search for a comprehensive ap-
proach (“Gesamtkonzept”) has slowed the dissemination of PPP; Austria 
seems to handle the issue more pragmatically.  
There are many similarities to the drivers for PPPs in Austria, Germany 
and the UK. The UK has had more experience, and the conservative-led gov-
ernment in Austria has been moving towards greater use of PPPs of the “pri-
vatisation”-type, but only very cautiously towards PPPs of the “PFI-type”. The 
major motives for moving towards PPPs are macro-economic or budgetary, 
especially in Germany and Austria, but also micro-economic or improving the 
efficiency of public service delivery, especially in the UK. In all three countries 
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PPPs appear to be a systematic middle response to the alternatives of privati-
sation or public service provision of infrastructure and operational support. 
In summary, being confronted with enormous investment needs, with tax 
income increasing only slowly and overall tax burdens being high, and with 
restrictions being placed on government’s ability to draw on borrowed money, 
new forms of investment finance received the attention of policy makers. 
PPPs are therefore primarily considered as a possible means to raise private 
funds and thus to close infrastructure gaps faster, and to improve the effi-
ciency of the provision of infrastructure. In addition, however, PPPs restrict the 
choices of future decision makers. Although PPPs have so far only played a 
minor role in Austria and Germany, there is considerable potential for expan-
sion, as has occurred in the UK. More theoretical analysis of PPP would be 
useful, for instance through adapting principal-agent models, theories of co-
operation, trust and partnership. One issue that remains crucial to the future 
impacts of PPPs is whether they offer genuine and sustainable increases in 
efficiency and effectiveness compared the alternatives. If they do then they 
should have a positive impact on future public resource availability, but if they 
do not then they may provide short-term financial and political benefits but at 
the cost of constraining future decision makers and placing greater pressures 
on public finances in the longer-term. Our analysis demonstrates that there is a 
broad scope of potential outcomes regarding the impact of PPP on overall effi-
ciency and that it is unclear if Public Private Partnerships are a sustainable so-
lution for the information society. 
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POVZETEK 
JAVNO-ZASEBNO PARTNERSTVO V  
EVROPSKI UNIJI: IZKU[NJE  
VELIKE BRITANIJE, NEM^IJE IN AVSTRIJE 
 
Soo~amo se s potrebo po ponovnem premisleku o vlogi gospodarske 
politike. Dolgoro~no gledano, so najpomembnej{e tiste ekonomske politi-
ke, katerih cilj je spodbujanje ustvarjalnosti in omogo~anje sprememb. Te 
politike so usmerjene k spreminjanju regulative, preoblikovanju tradicio-
nalnega dela in stimulativnega nagrajevanja in k oblikovanju okvirov za 
spodbujanje eksperimentalnih podjetni{kih pobud, ki ustvarjajo nove pro-
store, znotraj katerih je podjetni{tvo lahko uspe{no. Javno-zasebna part-
nerstva so pomembna z vseh treh vidikov. 
Veliko je razlogov »za in proti«, zakaj naj bi javne in zasebne organizacije 
razmi{ljale o sodelovanju v javno-zasebnih partnerstvih, kot na primer: razpo-
ložljivost virov, u~inkovitost in legitimnost. Prora~unske omejitve so pos-
tale glavna ovira pri uveljavljanju avtonomnosti nacionalnih politik, zato je 
v tem kontekstu koncept JZP postal pomemben v ve~ini evropskih držav. 
Natan~neje re~eno, JZP je znova postal pomemben, {e posebej v ~asu po 
osemdesetih letih 20. stoletja, kajti ne gre za povsem nov koncept, ampak 
za koncept, ki ima v mnogih državah že dolgo zgodovino. 
Velika Britanija je vodilna pri množi~nem uvajanju JZP na vseh gospodar-
skih podro~jih. Vlada Velike Britanije navaja tri glavne kategorije javno-
zasebnega partnerstva, ki zadevajo lastni{tvo, nudenje storitev (vklju~no z 
infrastrukturo) javnemu sektorju in prodajo storitev javnega sektorja dru-
gim (kot na primer z izkori{~anjem patentov). Poleg tega ima JZP {e ~etrto 
funkcijo, ki se prekriva z ostalimi, in sicer vzpostavljanje posredni{kih 
organizacij, ki ustvarjajo povezave med javnim, zasebnim in tretjim sektor-
jem za spodbujanje politik gospodarskega in družbenega razvoja. 
V Nem~iji je JZP {ele pred kratkim doseglo pomemben delež. Tre-
nutno lokalne skupnosti JZP uporabljajo predvsem za zagotavljanje 
infrastrukture za namene izobraževanja, {porta, turizma in prostega 
~asa, medtem ko se zvezne države in država poslužujejo JZP ve~inoma za 
gradnjo prometne infrastrukture, zaporov in upravnih stavb. 
V Avstriji pri JZP med partnerji iz javnega sektorja prevladujejo ob~ine. 
Lokalne skupnosti so udeležene predvsem pri energiji, zdravju, kanalizaciji 
in dejavnostih urbanega razvoja, kar v veliki meri odraža pristojnosti ob~in. 
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Zvezna vlada sodeluje predvsem pri izobraževalnih in tehnolo{kih projek-
tih, medtem ko ve~ina projektov zveznih držav spada v prometni sektor. 
Vlade Velike Britanije, Nem~ije in Avstrije imajo razli~en politi~ni kon-
tekst, toda vse tri so trenutno naklonjene JZP. V Nem~iji, {e bolj pa v Avs-
triji, zelo podpirajo družbo konsenza, kar pomeni, da poziv k omejevanju 
posegov države ni tako mo~no pod vplivom ideolo{kih pomislekov kot v 
anglosaksonskih državah. Sedanja vlada v Veliki Britaniji zagovarja JZP 
zaradi razpoložljivosti virov, izkoristka in kakovosti nudenja storitev, hkrati 
pa {e naprej ohranja vladni nadzor in financiranje ve~ine storitev in infras-
trukture. Naklonjenost konsenzu je bila ve~ja v Avstriji, ~eprav je tam po 
letu 2000 pri{lo do sprememb, ko so omejevanje posegov države in raz-
merje med davki in BDP zapisali kot jasen politi~ni cilj, pri ~emer bi JZP 
lahko bil eden od na~inov, kako to dose~i. V vseh treh državah se zdi, da 
so v ve~ini primerov zadržani glede pove~evanja neposredne privatizacije, 
~eprav lahko v nekaterih primerih JZP vidimo kot srednjo pot med privati-
zacijo in javnim zagotavljanjem storitev. 
V nem{kem in avstrijskem sistemu je ve~ pomembnih ve~stopenjskih 
ravni oblasti z ve~ avtonomnimi igralci vklju~no z zvezno vlado, zveznimi 
državami in ob~inami. Investicije zveznih držav in ob~in presegajo investi-
cijsko porabo zvezne vlade. V bolj centraliziranem sistemu Velike Britanije 
se je v poznih devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja na vlade na [kotskem, v 
Walesu in na Severnem Irskem prenesla ve~ina pristojnosti. Kljub temu 
javno porabo in investicije v infrastrukturo v teh delih države {e vedno v 
veliki meri nadzoruje vlada Velike Britanije, ki priskrbi veliko ve~ino njiho-
vih prihodkov. Tako so bile po vsej Veliki Britaniji politike za uvajanje JZP 
razmeroma hitro oblikovane in so si bile tudi podobne, a niso bile povsem 
enake. V Nem~iji je iskanje skupnega pristopa (Gesamtkonzept) 
upo~asnilo raz{irjanje JZP. Zdi se, da se Avstrija te problematike loteva 
bolj pragmati~no. 
Med gonili razvoja JZP v Avstriji, Nem~iji in Veliki Britaniji je precej 
podobnosti. Velika Britanija ima ve~ izku{enj, a konzervativna vlada v Avstriji 
se je bolj usmerila v uvajanje JZP “privatizacijskega” tipa in le zelo previd-
no v uvajanje JZP tipa PZF (pobuda zasebnega financiranja). Glavni motivi 
za uvajanje JZP so makroekonomski in prora~unski, zlasti v Nem~iji in 
Avstriji, hkrati pa so tudi mikroekonomski ali pa gre za željo po izbolj{anju 
u~inkovitosti nudenja javnih storitev, zlasti v Veliki Britaniji. V vseh treh 
državah se zdi, da je JZP na~rten kompromisni odziv na drugi dve možnosti, to 
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pa sta privatizacija oziroma zagotavljanje infrastrukture in operativne 
podpore s strani javnega sektorja. 
Ko so se oblikovalci politike soo~ili z ogromnimi investicijskimi potre-
bami, s po~asno rastjo prihodkov iz davkov in s splo{no visokimi 
dav~nimi obremenitvami ter z omejenimi možnostmi financiranja s posoji-
li, so postali pozorni na nove oblike financiranja investicij. Tako je JZP v 
prvi vrsti eden od možnih na~inov zbiranja sredstev iz zasebnih virov, kar 
omogo~a hitrej{e zapolnjevanje infrastrukturnih vrzeli in izbolj{anje izkori-
stka pri zagotavljanju infrastrukture. Toda po drugi strani JZP oži možne 
izbire bodo~ih oblikovalcev politike. ^eprav je imelo do zdaj JZP v Avstriji 
in Nem~iji le manj{o vlogo, obstaja velik potencial za {irjenje, kot smo 
videli na primeru Velike Britanije. Koristno bi bilo opraviti {e bolj teoretsko 
analizo JZP, na primer s pomo~jo prilagojenih modelov principala in 
agenta, ter teorije sodelovanja, zaupanja in partnerstva. Vpra{anje, ki 
ostaja klju~no za u~inek JZP v prihodnje, je: ali JZP v primerjavi z alterna-
tivami ponuja resni~no in trajnostno pove~evanje izkoristka in 
u~inkovitosti? ^e ga ponuja, potem bi moralo imeti pozitiven u~inek na razpo-
ložljivost javnih virov v prihodnje, ~e pa ga ne ponuja, potem bi resda imelo 
kratkoro~ne finan~ne in politi~ne koristi, toda na ra~un omejevanja 
bodo~ih oblikovalcev politike in na ra~un ustvarjanja velikih pritiskov na 
javne finance na dolgi rok. Analiza v ~lanku kaže, da obstaja {irok razpon 
možnih izidov u~inka JZP na izkoristek nasploh in da ni jasno, ali je javno-
zasebno partnerstvo trajnostna re{itev za informacijsko družbo. 
 
 
 
